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No worst there is none 
Pitched past pitch of grief
- Gerard Manley Hopkins
The devil brings drought. 
Men make hunger, 
Foreigners force famine.
— Makonde Proverb
(Cabo Delgado Province, Mozambique)
Do not go gentle into that good night
But rage, rage against the dying of the light.
- Dylan Thomas
London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Health Policy Unit - Seminar 
London - 18 November 1992
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7 The Apocalypse Drought
%
In 1991-92 the rains failed in most of Southern Africa - indeed except for 
northern Mozambique, parts of Malawi, Zambia and Angola and most of 
Tanzania they failed or were late and meagre from the Cape to Cairo. This 
disaster - the worst in over a century in half of Mozambique, Zimbabwe, 
most of Zambia and Malawi, Swaziland, Lesotho, perhaps Botswana and Namibia 
and also South Africa followed mixed, but generally below average, 1989-90 
and 1990-91 rains. In the words of a UNDP Resident Representative - "This 
really is the Apocalypse drought". The folk memory of the people of 
Mozambique's Gaza Province — "When the great river runs dry the end of the 
world is at hand" - burst into searing present reality as the massive 
Limpopo River turned into pools, trickles and cracked parched mud from 
Beitbridge in Zimbabwe through Mozambique virtually to the Indian Ocean.
FAO/WFP assessments as of April put the grain crop of the 10 Southern 
African Development Community (ex-SADCC) states at 56% of normal (35% 
excluding Angola and Tanzania). Grain import requirements for 1992-93 were 
estimated at 6,200,000 tonnes and other food import requirements at 500,000 
versus perhaps 1,000,000 and 250,000 in 1991-92. These estimates (which 
closely correspond to the SADCC's partial and the author's more 
comprehensive ones of February) in the event have proven broadly correct. 
Some countries' crops have turned out less disastrously than anticipated, 
but the figures probably underestimated need for famine relief and tended 
to build pre-existing food deficits (up to 25% of basic calorie needs for 
Angola and Mozambique) into their base.
The sheer horror of the shortage of water - for power, for irrigation, for 
livestock and for human beings - was badly underperceived in 
February/April. The initial deaths and the large scale flights to new 
locations (especially but not only in Mozambique and Zimbabwe) over 
April/October were largely the result of lack of water to drink. By 
November one city of over 1,000,000 (Bulawayo) and one of nearly 500,00 
(Beira) were severely rationed and in dire danger of having no supplies.
The same was true of much of rural southern Zimbabwe and Mozambique 
although early showers gave some promise of refreshing water sources and 
pastures. Power supplies were rationed or erratic in Zimbabwe, Zambia and 
Tanzania.
2As anticipated in February-April, the sheer magnitude of the crisis has 
overwhelmed national commercial import capacity, emergency pledging and 
domestic delivery/distribution capacity except in Botswana, Namibia and 
Tanzania. There have been swings and roundabouts with Zambia's and 
Swaziland's performances better than feared and Zimbabwe's below initial 
hopes (albeit at up to 30,000 tonnes a month to 5,000,000 beneficiaries by 
September-November it had achieved the largest operational net and coped 
with one of the greatest port to country logistical problems). In 
Mozambique a tenuous peace was enhancing distribution capacity but in 
Angola, Jonas Savimbi's refusal to accept electoral defeat and apparent 
return to war was having the opposite result.
With minor differences of emphasis and, perhaps, of country vignettes, that 
sketch is broadly agreed. So too is the prognosis that given inadequate 
grain pledges, lagged and uncertain deliveries and no real input into 
raising the Angolan and Mozambican distribution capacities, the death toll 
over 1992-93 will continue to rise. If war continues in Angola and 
shipping lags do so more generally, 100,000 famine/acute 
malnutrition/forced migration deaths may well result.
What is not agreed is what are the factors underlying 1991-93 (1991-92 
rains, 1992 harvest, 1992-93 lack of minimally adequate food and water). A 
number of causes have been argued:
1. agronomic/climatic;
2. technical (including foresight) and institutional weaknesses;
3. domestic technical and institutional failures;
4. national economic debilitation;
5. the interaction of war and drought;
6. international political economic considerations;
7. domestic political economic priorities.
In fairness, few would argue for only one cause - a position manifestly 
implausible on its face. However, it would be also fair to say that the 
political economic elements have received relatively less attention (within 
Southern Africa as well as internationally) than is merited. However, 
before exploring them it may be useful to look at the 1991 pre-drought 
context and the technico institutional factors at least briefly.
3The Third Horseman - And Fellow Travellers
The Apocalypse has four horsemen not one - War, Disease, Famine and Death. 
It is their joint assaults which are most lethal - a fact demonstrated in 
Southern Africa. Botswana, Namibia and Tanzania are confronted by a 
drought raised famine threat alone and are able to avert disease and death.
That underlines the significance of war - and particularly protracted war 
on one's own soil. The weakest links in Angola and Mozambique are from 
arrival at port to starving people. Parallel to that are huge gaps in 
rural basic medical services. The combination of inability to avert 
massive malnutrition and the parallel inability to provide basic 
preventative (e.g. vaccination and mother and child clinics) and curative 
(e.g. oral rehydration and antibiotics) health services fuels the lethal 
interaction between malnutrition and disease which has marked the downward 
spiral to unmarked graves for over 1,500,000 souls (out of a total 
population of perhaps 24,000,000) in these two countries since 1990.
Direct destruction of food, cumbersome convoys, lack of finance, rural 
insecurity, overstretched human and institutional capacity, excessive and 
often mutually contradictory donor initiatives cannot be analysed or 
understood without recognition that since at least 1980 (and arguably the 
early 1970s) no aspect of Angolan or Mozambican economic, political or 
social life and (especially) death can be analysed or understood seriously 
without considering war as an integral element, not merely as an off-stage 
noise.
The Price of Penury
National economic debilitation is clearly only partially independent of 
war. Over 1986-90 Southern Africa as a whole had a Gross Domestic Product 
growth rate above that of population and some - even if slow - improvement 
in most social indicators. But three countries stood out as exceptions, in 
part to the trends, but especially on absolute social indicator levels.
Two were Angola and Mozambique. For the third - Malawi - one needs to 
explore domestic political economic considerations. Its war bills 
(transport costs and - at household though not state budget level - 
refugees) were not self-evidently enough to cause the divergences (which in 
any case pre-date 1980) nor was its economic debilitation (at least at 
macro level) as severe as that of - say - Zambia and Tanzania.
4Despite 1986-90 recovery, most Southern African economies - with the 
notable exception of Botswana - were weak as of 1990. They lacked the 
capacity to lay aside reserves of foreign exchange, of budget flexibility, 
of food or of institutional capacity to ride out major shocks (drought or 
other) and, in some cases, even those necessary to bridge them until 
external assistance could be secured. The clear exception - Botswana - in 
1992 as in earlier droughts can, and does, set near universal access to 
afflicted households programmes in operation as soon as it perceives a 
drought disaster. It is able to afford the structure, the bills and the 
imports to do so because it has a buoyant economy and high external 
reserves. However, Tanzania, which is far more economically constrained, 
has had no famine deaths since the late 1950s - not even during the worst 
economic crisis period of 1981-83 which corresponded to a drought cycle - 
and appears likely to have few or none in 1992-93. As with Malawi - but in 
the opposite direction - the reasons appear to turn on domestic political 
economic priorities.
Zimbabwe is a special case. Over 1984-90 it operated a nationally crafted 
joint Structural Adjustment/War Cost Finance programme. It did produce a 
4% to 5% trend growth, rising exports, limited inflation, small current 
account deficits and sustained, if slow, social indicator gains. However, 
by 1990 it was running out of domestic capacity because it also squeezed 
fixed investment. The 1991 adoption of an internationally approved 
Structural Adjustment Programme (to raise external resources to revive 
business confidence and restore capacity growth parallel to declining war 
costs) went tremendously wrong. Whatever the reasons (compressing a five 
year time frame into two and altering sequencing is the most obvious 
explanation) it went into negative GDP growth, spiralling inflation, a 
yawning current account deficit and collapsing business confidence. That 
led to throwing grain reserves into exports to try to plug the trade gap 
and avert a self-justifying/inflation fuelling collapse of the exchange 
rate, to some delay in ordering grain import supplies in late 1991 and to 
far less capacity to buy commercially as of 1992 than had existed in 1990.
Perhaps the greatest direct result of economic debilitation is lagged 
action. Both the need to seek most drought relief finance externally (and 
to await its arrival) and the desperate hope that rain and crop forecasts 
will turn up, work against rapid action. Indirectly economic weakness 
often leads to low initial food supply/food requirement ratios and weak
5rural basic health services (both less true of Tanzania, arguably for 
domestic political economic priority reasons) which narrow survival margins 
and thus increase the damage done by any significant shock.
The Weather Gods Are Angry — Or Are They?
The arguments about secular climatic changes in Southern Africa are not 
conclusive. The region is characterised by drought cycles which do vary in 
length over time and among countries. On the whole, since 1972/73 (weather 
and crop year) the cycles have tended to have longer periods of successive 
average-to-good and of fair-to-disastrous years. 1989/90 seems to have 
marked entry into a cyclical downswing. (The last previous one 1979/80 - 
1983/84 lasted five years which is not a cheering thought.) The evidence 
of secular rainfall shifts is not, to date, convincing.
In respect to 1991/92 two special factors have been adduced - the eruption 
of Mount Pinatubo and the behaviour of the (rather blasphemously named) El 
Nino current in the Eastern Pacific. To the extent they were significant, 
1992/93 rains should be better since Pinatubo's 1992 eruption is much less 
dusty and El Nino has disintegrated early.
However, there is an arguable case that population growth (and the heritage 
of land theft) have forced more and more sector familial households either 
to abandon long rotation (so-called shifting) cultivation before developing 
viable and sustainable short rotation intensive techniques or out onto 
marginal or extra marginal (particularly in terms of security of rainfall) 
land. This argument is strongest in respect to Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland 
and Zimbabwe and weakest in respect to Tanzania and Zambia. Mozambique and 
Angola are special cases because war has caused over-cultivation and 
inadequate sized plots in less insecure rural and peri urban areas even 
though there is no general land scarcity nor any crippling inherited 
malallocation constraint of the type afflicting Zimbabwe, Namibia and 
Swaziland.
While not denying agronomic/climatic factors' importance over time, the 
evidence does not appear to suggest a major secular element behind 1989/90 
- 1991/92 downturn in rainfall and production growth. If 1991/92 has been 
a special case for climatic reasons - a hopeful but unproven hypothesis -
6it relates to a one-off (Pinatubo) and to a rather irregular, loosely 
correlated (El Nino vagaries) cause.
Muddled Methods vs Methodical Models
The technico-institutional argument focuses on the undeniable fact that 
given available knowledge response to post 1980s - and especially 1991/92 
(or 1992-93) - droughts could have been prompter, quantitatively more 
adequate and qualitatively more effective.
In 1991-93 early warning lights went amber in December, red in January and 
flashing red with sirens by March. This is not being wise after the event 
- the data are in FAO/WFP and SADCC early warning system reports, however 
low key the analysis and - especially - the highlighting before February in 
the SADCC and March/April in the FAO/WFP case. Technical deficiencies of 
the early warning system exist but can hardly bear much of the blame for 
tardy and inadequate response. On balance domestic/regional (SADCC- 
Zimbabwe-Zambia-Namibia-Mozambique) high key warnings came before 
international (which were first voiced emphatically by international NGOs 
and UNICEF). The lag on the part of the UN system was real and does 
require future correction - e.g. highlighting amber lights and bringing the 
schedule of study teams into line with last dates consistent with an 
emergency appeal being able to deliver food just in time rather than just 
too late. However, the lags (perhaps because of domestic and NGO pressure) 
were, in fact, below average and appear to have been conditioned by the 
perception that donors had become bored with continuing food emergencies in 
Southern Africa so would not respond to early warnings but only to palpable 
evidence of assured massive famine.
National technical capacity is uneven. In the broadest sense it is lowest 
when there is war and/or massive foreign intervention in designing it and 
in introducing parallel systems (uniformly unsatisfactory both 
operationally in national decapacitating effects). But the Mozambican 
capacity is less weak than the Angolan (which has 'benefited' by far less 
international support) apparently because of demonstrably different 
political economic priorities. The correlation of capacity with economic 
strength or debilitation is not very good. Botswana has the best 
institutional capacity to reach the afflicted, to do so to a substantial 
degree by employment to earn food and to do so by expanding ongoing (non­
crisis) safety net programmes. To that extent solvency, and the room for
7national designing and decision-taking which it buys, helps. But arguably 
the second greatest capacity is Tanzania's. Rough and ready and cut price 
as it is, it delivers food to drought (or flood) impacted districts. Its 
weaknesses in building useful employment in public works into relief and in 
not relating emergency programming to ongoing nutrition enhancement 
programmes are real but the fact remains that on the basis of general 
economic data one would expect lower capacity in Tanzania than in fact 
exists. Zambia in 1992 appears to have created capacity out of nothing 
(including a low political economic priority) whereas Zimbabwe has failed 
to make a sophisticated institutional structure work promptly and 
effectively (despite priority). Swaziland - with no real history of 
distribution - has effectively subcontracted to domestic NGOs (especially 
its National Red Cross) while Malawi with almost as little experience has - 
predictably - done little carrying its malign neglect to the point of 
endangering the regime's survival.
The most reasonable conclusions ares
1. war erodes national capacity as well as increasing the need for it;
2. economic debilitation may or may not reduce domestic technical capacity 
depending on relative domestic political economic priorities;
3. irresistible foreign intervention in structuring national and creating 
parallel technico/institutional systems is (beyond the very short term) 
disastrous;
4. some technical differences appear to be genuinely independent of other 
factors, e.g. Zimbabwe and CARE on the minus and Zambia and Action Aid 
on the plus side;
5. but in several cases explanations which do not include domestic 
political economic (and less lucidly external political economic) 
priorities appear somewhat procrustean.
Any such summary may be misleading. There are very genuine differences 
domestically and also among international actors on how to increase 
technical capacity. For example, the dominant Mozambican position (which 
was followed until 1984) was to coordinate emergency food distribution 
using contract hire private transport firms who were thereby enabled to 
survive, rebuild and bring out whatever rural surpluses existed. A
8USAID/CARE alliance since 1984 (with the passive, bureaucratic preference 
based support of UNDP) has focused on monolithic, state run lorry fleets. 
Disagreeing bilaterals, EEC and WFP have set up parallel, de facto 
competitive distribution systems (at least two financed by USAID). The 
Mozambique institutions are not uniformly pro-contract hire and coherent 
national coordination but were they the sole arbiters that position would 
prevail. More crucial has been the question of how many donors would walk 
out if their, and their captive (or captor?) NGOs, preferences were not 
pandered to. That question is a hard one to evaluate and one to which 
prudence counsels caution for a country dependent on external resources for 
85% of imports and 75% of combined Recurrent-Investment-Emergency budgets. 
Unfortunately caution in acquiescing in a cornucopia (Pandora's box?) of 
different externally backed delivery mechanisms rapidly leads to 
incoherence with nobody clear on the overall position and nobody in a 
position to articulate and to implement strategy.
Some donor technical failings appear to be related to specific bureaucratic 
inertia or inadequate information. Enthusiasms for food stamps and for low 
wage public works to assist urban destitute households whose real problems 
turn not on unemployment but on starvation level real wages and high mouths 
to hands ratios are probable examples. Others - e.g. the total failure to 
schedule and deliver food aid shipments up to the minimum standards any 
commercial recipient would require - turn on the lack of effective 
recipient countervailing power. But most appear to flow from the basic 
assumptions of the (donor) political economy of emergency assistance.
Drought, Democracy and History: External Political Economies
There is arguably a moderately uniform donor political economy of 
emergencies - including drought. There clearly are two much more 
fragmented political economies (of democracy, where once favoured 
authoritarians of the right are no longer useful, and of historic affection 
or disquiet/detestation, outliving initial causes) which affect particular 
donors and recipients.
In a slightly reductionist form the political economy of emergencies turns 
on six basic propositions:
1. emergencies caused by exogenous events justify and call forth a short 
term, survival assistance oriented response;
92. this response is quite separate from ongoing or future development 
cooperation, useful in that it can go to the people of states otherwise 
seen as beyond the pale but unhelpful in respect to facilitating 
livelihood recuperation even after short term calamities;
3. it should be bounded by 12 to 24 months (apparently an earthquake not a 
multi year drought - let alone a war - is the implicit "ideal type" 
calamity) except in the case of support (usually via UNHCR) to 
international (but not domestic) refugees;
4. calamities are stochastic, exogenous events with no projectable 
patterns of regional or national recurrence and therefore can be 
treated best by one-off responses assuming no institutionalised 
national or household coping capacity;
5. in ascending order, saving life is important, saving physical and 
financial resources more so and adhering to due bureaucratic procedures 
(wildly divergent among donors) the most important;
6. the more the assistance needed and the longer the period for which it 
is needed the more incompetent - by definition - the recipient country 
and the greater the right (indeed the duty) of donors (bilateral and 
external NGO - the World Bank does not perhaps sensibly, act in respect 
to short term calamities and, less self-evidently sensibly, has not 
seriously addressed the rehabilitation of livelihoods/economic 
reconstruction link between long term emergency survival support and 
'standard1 development assistance) to "do their own thing" independent 
of national (including civil society) institutions.
The first four elements in this "conventional wisdom" are now coming under 
criticism - e.g. by the UK, ODA, by UNICEF, by several international NGOs. 
The trend over 1977-1992 suggests that the old orthodoxy is in the process 
of dissolution, but it is unclear what will replace it.
To say this is not, at least not necessarily, to posit evil intentions.
"The road to hell is paved with good intentions" seems a particularly apt 
comment on the political economy of emergency support. Each of the five 
assumptions may be appropriate in some contexts - even the sixth probably 
is correct in the short run in Somalia (outside ex-British Somaliland) 
where the difference between self-styled Presidents and Generals and armed
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extortionists interested in their own welfare to the exclusion of all other 
interests (including providing any semblance of civil governance as usually 
understood) is by no means evident. As a uniform implicit conventional 
wisdom the consensus has been ideological and reductionist even if not in 
left/right terms. Certainly virtually it is inefficient and all too 
literally kills people in the 1990s Southern African context.
There is indeed a difference between murder and negligent homicide and 
(unlike some critics) the author does not see any conspiracy to commit 
murder. However, for the dead and their bereaved or for states and leaders 
desperately concerned to save lives and rehabilitate livelihoods, it is 
cold comfort to know that the deaths are by-products of the best intentions 
combined with the worst perceptions of realities and of how to address 
them, of bureaucratic business as usual, or of the 'Republics' of a 
variegated array of self-annointed Platonic guardians. Those afflicted by 
drought and their governments may not have very clear or articulated 
perceptions on what needs to be done or how to do it right. On what is 
being done wrong at least some know what Blake recognised "The toad beneath 
the harrow knows, where every separate tooth point goes".
Whether this conventional approach is racist as opposed to professional 
centric is debatable. Professional capacity (or at any rate numbers) and 
funding are overwhelmingly Northern. In addition the present (albeit not 
the 1970s) version of the model is heavily influenced by the concept of 
"the deserving poor" (who become undeserving if natural calamities or human 
created catastrophes - including donor botches - cause the emergency to 
drag on beyond two to three years) and the poor (whether perceived as 
"deserving" or no longer deserving) are mainly black. Subjectively and 
explicitly it is not necessary to posit racism. However, observation 
suggests that implicitly and objectively it does play a role albeit 
probably a subsidiary one.
The results of this paradigm (or model) in the Southern African states - 
and especially in those most desperately needing external finance, 
knowledge and personnel resources - is, to put it mildly, distinctly 
unsatisfactory.
The economic debilitation and, in two cases, war crises are long lasting 
and the droughts recurrent. Therefore, one-off, approaches and fixed (or 
attempted) cut off points related to time alone are unsound. Similarly in
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many cases substantial national historic memory, analytical and 
institutional capacity does exist.
Especially in the context of long term programmes, setting up parallel 
external systems (or expatriate run enclaves within nominally national 
ones) is simply inefficient. The loss of coherence, the duplication of 
overheads and - especially - the progressive decapacitation, fragmentation 
and denigration of national (including civil society and domestic NGO) 
capacity is a high price to pay for external support during the emergency 
and one which is likely to continue long after it.
The failure to link emergency survival to normal development via a 
reconstruction bridge of household livelihood rehabilitation backed by 
basic social and human investment, local infrastructure (especially rural 
and peri urban) and market access (including rural trading and urban micro 
enterprise sectors) restoration is both logically unsound and practically 
likely to be disastrous. In the extreme case of Mozambique, the end of war 
(probably in hand), the return of normal rains (as likely as not for 
1992/93) and the mass return home of the war/drought dislocated and 
pauperised 50% of all living Mozambicans (7,000,000 of 14,000,000 - the 
'missing' 2,000,000 versus population projections being at least two-thirds 
direct and indirect war dead) which has already begun will if there is a 
rapid run down of Emergencia and Refugee support be only too likely to 
result in the obscene and avertable paradox that peace and good rains kill 
as many (at least in the short run) as war and drought did.
The defects of this political economic approach are relatively evident. 
Partly because of its moral economic/disaster alleviating focus, it has 
tendencies both to deepen dependence and to be underfunded. The former 
results in part from the failure to link livelihood rehabilitation to 
survival. (The Swahili proverb about giving a fishing line not a fish is 
very apt - tinned fish has been distributed to dislocated persons who would 
have been better served by lines, plus perhaps nets and tools to build 
canoes.) In addition the short term survival focus raises the priority 
given to getting the food out and reduces the concern that doing so by 
parallel channels decapacitates national governmental and civil society 
institutions. The underfunding is initially the result of unanticipated 
(even if projectable) calls for resources after budgets have been prepared
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and later flows from the belief emergencies shouldn't last over 18 to 24 
months.
A different approach to the political economic location of long term 
emergency support - e.g. in Mozambique - has been proposed by the World 
Bank. The case is that survival is a precondition for development and how 
resources are used to meet that precondition will affect the trajectory, 
speed and efficiency of subsequent development. From this perspective, 
multi year food aid programmes are an aspect of import support (and 
therefore, as the Bank sees it, of structural adjustment).
This approach is particularly convincing in respect to commercialised, 
multi year food aid and to post war reconstruction support. It is not 
particularly attuned to rapid response nor to short duration, limited 
geographical location cases because overall Consultative Group type 
assessment, coordination, delivery processes are Byzantine in complexity 
and glacial in ability (or lack of it) to alter course. More basically 
despite the Bank's new handbook and Operational Directive on Poverty 
Reduction, it is not at all clear it now'has an articulated strategic 
conceptualization of post war reconstruction. This is historically ironic 
as four and a half decades ago the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development's basic stock in trade was post war reconstruction.
Locating the political economy of survival support within that of 
development is not merely rationalisation of institutional self-interest 
(although World Bank-UNDP-bilateral agency-NGO dialogue might suggest the 
reverse). It does offer a more coherent - albeit as now adumbrated 
insufficiently flexible - conceptualization of emergency assistance as part 
of total support and of short term survival as the beginning of a continuum 
leading through medium term reconstruction to longer term development.
The application of the general 'Good Samaritan' model of the political 
economy of disaster relief is heavily influenced by country specific donor 
concerns and perceptions, whether accurate or not, of recipients. These 
can be very specific relating to placating small but pugnacious home 
interest groups - e.g. the otherwise incredible use of World Vision as a 
major USAID vehicle in Mozambique despite its (reciprocated) hostility to 
both the government and the main civil society bodies (Catholic, main line 
Protestant and Islamic). At the opposite extreme they can be global 
geopolitical. Low and indirect US funding for famine relief in Angola
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related to US cold war strategy (and to its curious perception of Cuba as a 
great power) much more than to the actual nature of the Angolan regime much 
less to the famine or its causes. Similarly, the delay in pledging and 
especially delivering food aid to Mozambique until the Nkomati Accord had 
been signed related primarily to US Southern African regional strategy not 
to events on ground in Mozambique nor to technical problems in procurement 
and shipping.
Similarly, the present enthusiasm for promoting multi party governments - 
especially where an old, tired autocracy has lost its geopolitical pawn 
value and is visibly eroding in ways threatening stability - while in 
principle exempting emergency assistance from the use of sticks and 
carrots, in fact does reduce emergency support for unfavoured regimes.
This may not affect food per se but certainly does relate to water supply, 
logistics, transport and institutional capacity and - above all - to rural 
development programmes which might reduce vulnerability to future droughts 
at both household and national levels.
In general the less poor a country, the greater its assumed capacity to 
finance emergency imports itself and, especially, to handle all costs after 
arrival. The principle makes sense. Pretty clearly the case for 
cooperation in emergency coping in Botswana has to be either human 
solidarity or general development cooperation, not that Botswana either 
could not or would not avert famine and massive deprivation on its own.
And, in fact, Botswana receives relatively little emergency assistance in 
contrast to its substantial capital and technical assistance receipts. 
However, three problems arise. The first is a rather austere implicit 
means test (apparently applying to Zimbabwe in 1992/93) requiring the 
country to pay a portion of costs likely to derail any forward dynamic 
combined with failure to consider the overall burdens on available 
resources (e.g. Angola in the context of substantial oil exports but also 
of colossal war bills resulting in large part from South African and US 
intervention). Second, there is a tendency to equate GDP per capita with 
ability to finance emergency programmes without adequate attention to 
fiscal capacity, special demands on state resources or inequality of income 
distribution. Namibia has been ill-served by this approach both on the 
development and emergency assistance fronts.
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The third is perhaps a general famine aid point as much as a country 
specific political economy one, but operates in respect to the special case 
of a country with food ration/work for food calamity offsetting 
requirements in excess of import requirements while at the same time having 
a serious domestic fiscal constraint. A clear case is Tanzania 1992-93 
with northern and southern regional grain surpluses largely offsetting 
central and north-western drought deficits at the national physical supply 
level. However, the drought stricken households lack effective purchasing 
power and the stability of the state budget is, at best, precarious.
Because the starting point of emergency assistance is the national food 
deficit (with related funding tied to it), Tanzania has simply not been 
considered for substantial emergency assistance despite being very poor, 
very concerned and very much at risk of severe criticism of the resultant 
fiscal deficit if it uses (as it is doing) substantial domestic fiscal 
resources to provide rations through domestic procurement and distribution.
Who Cares? Why? Domestic Political Economies of Poverty and Calamity
Distinct problems arise in evaluating national political economic 
priorities:
1. whatever the differences, they do not run on left-right or free market 
capitalist-social democratic lines;
2. rhetoric is not the best indication of actual priorities;
3. priorities at state/government level do not uniformly lead to 
institutional technical and distributional capacity to meet them, even 
if resources do appear to be available and reaction after calamities 
hit suggest the priorities are real;
4. priority to the welfare of and/or enhanced production by poor 
households does not appear to be closely correlated to its potential 
macro economic importance nor even to its short run electoral 
significance albeit a stronger case can be made for perceived links to 
the latter;
5. in certain cases (notably Tanzania, Botswana and Mozambique) there is 
reason to believe that the commitment to enabling poor and absolutely 
poor households to become less poor has been derived from the moral 
principles of a limited number of leaders first and given articulated
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political economic justification subsequently since it is hard 
otherwise to explain the differences between Malawi and Tanzania or 
Angola and Mozambique.
Objectively it is apparent that not all ruling coalitions do give high 
priority to alleviating the suffering caused by drought (or drought and 
war). Among those that do, how high the priority is and the raison d'etat 
bases for it vary.
One basis is moral economic - the belief that (as Adam Smith put it) no
nation can be great and prosperous the majority of whose people are poor 
and miserable. This is a perception rarely totally absent and most likely 
to have some operational force in the face of mass starvation. But — at 
least in terms of resource allocations over time (more broadly than just 
emergency relief) it evidently varies in priority. On that basis it has 
the greatest political economic force in Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia,
Tanzania and Zimbabwe and the least in Angola and Malawi. Whatever the
basis for this diversity it is clearly not ideological in the traditional 
left/right sense. Nor is it linked closely with egalitarianism even in the 
sense of limits on income inequality. That philosophy has never had much 
operational impact outside Tanzania whereas the moral economic imperative 
of assuring some minimum to all persons has been more broadly influential.
A political economic reason for priority to the livelihoods (and therefore 
the survival and rehabilitation) of poor households is that their 
production and demand are perceived as structurally crucial at macro 
economic level either in terms of present levels or/and of growth dynamics. 
Mozambique and - much less coherently - Tanzania are clear examples. 
Botswana and Namibia are not because their absolutely poor and vulnerable 
household sectors are of very marginal present or plausible future macro 
economic significance.
Political survival reasons fall in two groups. If politicians perceive 
themselves as accountable to, and are in practice electorally dismissable 
by, poor - and especially poor rural - voters then their concern for the 
rural family farming sector - including its needs in the context of drought 
- is likely to be significant. This does require relatively open and 
competitive elections but not any particular political system as the two 
present clear-cut examples (Namibia could well become a third and 
Mozambique a fourth) of Botswana and Tanzania illustrate. In a much
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narrower sense, rural famine and acute urban hunger are political structure 
life threatening so that any ruling group with reasonable self-preservation 
instincts and foresight will try to avert or defuse them. However, that 
factor alone does not necessarily appear to result in high priority being 
given to timely or to adequate measures - e.g. Malawi.
Special problems arise in the interpretation of Zimbabwe, Zambia and 
Angola. The former has allocated substantial resources to programmes 
intended to benefit the welfare and the livelihoods of poor Zimbabweans.
By 1983/84 it had built up a highly effective problem reporting, food 
delivery and work for food network backed by large national resource 
allocation as well as internationally mobilised funds. It backed this with 
a very (perhaps too) large inter-year food reserve. But by 1990 the 
reporting and delivery mechanisms had ossified. In 1991/92 the national 
reserves were run down in a way hard to characterise other than as 
reckless. The 1992/93 supply procurement, logistical, and - especially - 
distribution systems revival were lagged and initially chaotic. On the 
other hand, as of late 1992, 25,000 to 30,000 tonnes a month were reaching 
about 5,000,000 recipients, probably virtually double the attained level of 
any other Southern African state. Once seriously begun the logistical 
exercise from procurement through delivery to Zimbabwe was both a top 
priority and a model of efficiency and from December 1991 substantial 
import orders were placed out of Zimbabwean foreign exchange earnings 
without waiting for external assistance.
Zambia's governing coalition has historically never perceived small family 
farmers as economically significant nor has it ever devoted substantial 
resources to enabling them to enhance their livelihoods. The largest use 
of state resources in respect to food until very recently was subsidising 
consumers, the second subsidising marketing boards and cooperatives of 
startling physical and well as financial inefficiency and the third, 
subsidising large farmers. Because over 40% of the population is urban, 
imports plus food subsidies were a moderately effective famine prevention 
strategy except for the hardest hit rural areas where a rather sketchy 
ration delivery system did avert famine. By 1990 the forex, cash and rural 
delivery capacity had run out and as of 1992 the reshuffled governing 
coalition did not appear particularly small family farmer oriented.
However, the response to drought in terms of ringing the Tocsin was early 
and energetic and the distribution of food (including commercial imports
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seen as a priority out of very limited own resource import capacity) has on 
the whole been creative and effective.
Angola has followed a tightly prioritised resource distribution strategy:
1. the hydro carbon sector - the basic source of foreign exchange and
fiscal flows essential to funding other priorities;
2. the armed forces to fight a high technology war against a regional
power and an externally backed insurgency - the precondition for
governing coalition survival;
3. providing adequate living standards to key officers, managers and
workers in the two key sectors and in the political establishment to 
ensure their morale and loyalty;
4. sustaining as much as possible of human investment in health and
education and providing some safety nets for the more accessible
destitute victims of the war.
Priority four was real, but the first three used up not only 90% of state 
resources but also 90% of high level citizen personnel explaining the 
paradox that civil governance, human and social investment services and 
emergency capacity (unlike military) was distinctly lower and even patchier 
than in much poorer Mozambique.
This prioritisation is arguably consistent with concern for poor people - 
until the war was won in respect to South Africa and peace by conquest or 
reconciliation achieved domestically, real progress in production or in 
access to services by poor Angolans was not attainable. But it has gone 
hand in hand with a highly hierarchical, concentrated elite political 
coalition and the emergence of broader vested interest enclaves unlikely to 
be much altered by a reconciliation incorporating UNITA's elite leadership. 
Whether elections and/or (in the context of less inadequate resources) 
noblesse oblige will result in significant upgrading of the political 
economic priority given to poverty reduction and calamity alleviation is 
highly problematic.
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What Might Usefully Be Done?
Analysis is a basis from which it may be possible to construct action. 
Unfortunately it does not always lead to any clear lines toward feasible 
action and is certainly rarely of such a Damascus Road illumination nature 
as to be self-activating. This is especially true when the proposed shifts 
either require acting against perceived self-interest or recasting of 
comfortable perceptions about oneself (whether personal or institutional) 
and others.
The political economic focus actually serves rather well to propose 
technical changes since many technical weaknesses are, at the least, 
intertwined with broader conceptual issues:
1. calamities (natural disasters) should be perceived as recurrent, not 
one-off, events both globally and nationally;
2. therefore, both at donor and (even more crucial) national level, 
permanent institutional structures able to expand to large scale 
activity within two to four months are needed;
3. allowing forward planning of useful work for food based small scale 
infrastructure schemes both to enable calamity stricken households to 
sustain self-respect and self-reliance and to add some material output 
to the overriding survival priority;
4. planning calamity offsetting programmes in a way conducive to 
sustaining rural transport and market mechanisms, e.g. paying cash to 
buy food and - if food transport under Calamity Commission auspices is 
necessary - contracting out haulage to domestic enterprises in ways 
encouraging back haul of whatever the rural area has to sell;
5. accepting the imperative of a single, nationally-led coordinating 
institution (and of enough harmonisation of donor procedures to allow 
both coordination and transparency) while avoiding creating external 
enclaves and parallel systems or using technical assistance to co-opt 
previously national mechanisms;
6. recognising that after most calamities (single year droughts with 
limited livestock losses are often exceptions) livelihood 
rehabilitation (replacement of working capital in seeds, tools,
livestock and repair of fixed capital in land clearing and homes) is 
virtually always needed and that after catastrophes (human caused 
disasters - basically war) broader infrastructure, human and social 
investment services and market network reconstruction are likely to be 
needed;
and, therefore, linking the emergency survival and livelihood 
rehabilitation phases of calamity/catastrophe alleviation and reversal;
implying both a longer time horizon and one related to contextual 
reality not dogma or rules of thumb;
plus a recognition that avoiding the need to move away from home 
(achievable in most droughts albeit not in wars) greatly reduces the 
cost and time required for rehabilitation so that early response to 
warnings of impending disaster is crucial;
and that future vulnerability reduction elements (e.g. drought 
resistant seed, rehabilitation/augmentation of water supplies, 
veterinary as well as human basic drug reserves, basic national inter­
year food reserves adequate to ride out the lag before commercial or 
aid import flows arrive in crisis years) are part of 
Emergency/Rehabilitation operations;
paralleled by a less paternalistic perception of calamity/catastrophe 
afflicted households (and countries) based on a treble realisation that 
they usually know their own circumstances better than outsiders, have 
developed substantial (if fragile and subject to overloading) 
capacities to cope and - however generous external (whether to 
household or to country) support - bear the main financial, social and 
burdens of the calamity/catastrophe and of the ways in which it is 
faced (or fudged). (International "boredom" and "fatigue" over 
Mozambique's decade-long emergency are real enough but the very terms 
are rather obscene when set against the anguish of the 7,000,000 
afflicted Mozambicans who are alive, let alone the fate of over a 
million and a quarter of their compatriots who are dead.);
Strongly suggesting that austere, precise national or household means 
testing is inappropriate because it runs down working capital which is 
needed for rehabilitation and also normatively objectionable since
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substantial emergency programmes are virtually always to households and 
countries who - at least in the presence of calamity - are at socially 
unacceptable standards of poverty and misery. (If resources are 
inadequate 'rationing' may be necessary but the target should be 
related to true need and the shortfall visible not concealed by 
trimming the need to meet some idea of what "funders will bear".);
13. and a recognition that if survival and livelihood restoration are
political economic priorities ("moral economy" in Adam Smith's perhaps 
more apt terminology) then conditioning support for them (as relatively 
broadly defined above) to external economic, domestic political or 
geopolitical objectives of donors is inappropriate (to use the mildest 
plausible term).
This agenda is certainly applicable in the North and in Southern African 
countries which do give significant priority to calamity coping by/for poor
households. In a sense it is also valid for domestic advocates of major
domestic political priority change. In a sense - the danger to an advocate 
in the North is a dusty answer but in - e.g. - Malawi, that to a domestic
advocate may be a dusty prison cell... or worse. Therefore, for the
external advocates and especially those with state backing, respect for 
domestic priorities and leadership objective can, at least in principle, 
clash with the priority for human survival and livelihood rehabilitation.
To this dilemma there are no easy answers and those there are can only be 
applied within realistic appraisals of contexts:
1. if there is a substantially accountable government which does give some 
priority to emergency survival/poverty reduction outside intervention 
by means of "sticks" is unlikely to be appropriate (and intervention by 
using technical assistance to try to change basic priorities is likely 
to be quite ineffective);
2. but in those circumstances substantial emergency programmes will in 
practice be accepted and can usually be tied to provision of national 
institutional and personnel inputs. Even if that "carrot" may well not 
be the government's first choice, it is likely to be accepted;
3. with the side result of building up the domestic base for emergency 
survival and reconstruction/poverty reduction prioritisation;
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4. while withholding or underfunding emergency support is usually quite 
unlikely to cause basic domestic political economic change and 
certainly does not help afflicted people survive;
5. but contexts do exist in which national governing group priorities are 
totally inimical to survival, let alone rehabilitation, support and 
mass diversion of resources to elite uses with little left for intended 
beneficiaries is quite predictable (e.g. Somalia, Sudan);
6. in these cases tightly externally supervised programmes (with the 
maximum feasible involvement of domestic civil society and - if 
appropriate - local governance bodies) is likely to be the least bad 
attainable option with the "stick" not usually a threat to halt 
emergency support but to review and reduce other economic and political 
support;
7. with the possible exception of de facto international 'trusteeship' 
emergency operations if and when both near total lack of both civil 
governance and very limited capacity to resist armed protection of 
operations (e.g. Somalia) or a global context which renders the 
government a pariah (e.g. in respect to Iraqi Kurdistan) make them 
possible.
The argument that some governments behave in ways forfeiting their claim to 
sovereignty because violation of basic human rights is integral, not 
incidental, to their governance is valid. However, there is little reason 
to believe effective international intervention to reform or to replace 
such regimes is generally practicable (vide Sudan, Serbia or, indeed, so 
far as the North went, Idi Amin's Uganda regime). Further, whether such 
intervention could quickly lead to a peaceful context or to a transition 
toward a better national regime is problematic. It is, however 
unfortunately, clear that the use of an international trustee force to 
topple the last Ethiopian emperor (Mengistu) was never on and that - 
however unsatisfactory - the external support that was injected did save 
lives (and could have saved more had low income household livelihood 
rehabilitation been included) while at the same time it is doubtful that it 
delayed the overthrow of the regime.
These conclusions in reBpect to domestic priorities may appear pessimistic 
but more by comparison with utopia than with present reality. No Southern
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African regime will actually reject emergency assistance targeted to 
severely affected people (even if at least one is very reticent about 
admitting to crises). Even in the low domestic political economic priority 
cases substantial progress on the thirteen point agenda is practicable and 
would save lives and rehabilitate livelihoods quite literally in their 
thousands.
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